INTRODUCTION
Since the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , expected utility theory has been the dominant framework for analyzing decision making under uncertainty. Consequently, Borch (1960) also assumed in his pioneering paper on efficient risksharing that all individuals are expected utility maximizers. Since the work of Borch (1960) , efficient risk-sharing has been extensively treated in the expected utility framework (see Gollier, 1992, and Gollier, 1995 , for reviews).
Since the famous "Allais Paradox" (see Allais, 1953) , however, a large body of empirical evidence has been gathered that shows that individuals tend to systematically violate the independence axiom of expected utility theory.
This empirical evidence has motivated researchers to develop alternative theories of choice under uncertainty (see Schmidt, 1999 , for a survey) that rest on weakened variants of the independence axiom. A well-known class of these non-expected utility theories is the rank-dependent model. Variants of rank-dependent utility are anticipated utility (see Quiggin, 1982) and the dual theory of choice under risk (see Yaari, 1987) , henceforth referred to as dual expected utility. An important difference between expected utility and dual expected utility can be characterized by the concept of first-order risk aversion as defined by Segal and Spivak (1990) . Note that the risk premium for a small risk is in expected utility theory proportional to the variance of the risk, at least if the utility function is twice differentiable. This fact has been termed second-order risk aversion. In contrast, first-order risk aversion implies that this risk premium is proportional to the standard deviation rather than the variance. There are several theories of risk preference, which exhibit first-order risk aversion. Apart from dual expected utility, also all other rank-dependent models, as well as the theory of disappointment aversion (see Gul, 1991) and semi-weighted utility (see Chew, 1989) belong to this class.
Applications of non-expected utility models have shown that first-order risk aversion generates results that differ significantly from those of expected utility theory Ulrich Schmidt is at the Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Finanzwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. The author is indebted to two anonymous referees for their detailed and helpful comments. Financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged. and lead in many cases to a better accommodation of real world data. For instance, first-order risk aversion can resolve the equity premium puzzle (see Epstein and Zin, 1990) and explain that individuals buy full insurance even at unfair odds (see Schlesinger, 1997) . Further applications of first-order risk aversion appeared, among others, in Demers and Demers (1990) , Epstein and Zin (1991) , Segal and Spivak (1992) , Konrad and Skaperdas (1993) , Schlee (1995) , and Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) . Additionally, first-order risk aversion is also an empirically viable hypothesis as shown by the experiment of Loomes and Segal (1994) .
The goal of this article is to provide a complete characterization of efficient risksharing with dual expected utility (DEU). Apart from first-order risk aversion, a second characteristic property of DEU is the linearity in payments. Therefore, DEU seems to be particularly appropriate to represent the behavior of firms. This has been explained by Yaari (1987, p. 96) as follows:
In studying the behavior of firms, linearity in payments may in fact be an appealing feature. Under the dual theory, maximization of a linear function of profits can be entertained simultaneously with risk aversion. How often has the desire to retain profit maximization led to contrived arguments about firms' risk neutrality? Moreover, as shown by Guriev (1998) , even the representation of the behavior of a risk-neutral firm facing a bid-ask spread on the credit market is given by DEU.
Note that efficient risk-sharing has already been analyzed by Machina (1995) in a non-expected utility framework. Machina shows that all important results derived with expected utility carry over to Fréchet-differentiable preference functionals, which generalize expected utility by replacing the independence axiom with a much weaker differentiability assumption. However, as shown by Segal and Spivak (1990) , all Fréchet-differentiable preference functionals exhibit second-order risk aversion. Consequently, the analysis of Machina (1995) does not apply to DEU. The crucial role of Fréchet-differentiability for some of Machina's results has already been stressed by Karni (1995) .
DEU and the concepts of first-order and second-order risk aversion are introduced in the next section. In section 3 we present our model of risk-sharing. The analysis reveals that, also for efficient risk-sharing, DEU has quite different implications than expected utility. These differences are further discussed in the final section.
DUAL EXPECTED UTILITY
The two characteristic features of rank-dependent utility (RDU) are, first, that outcomes are ordered in an increasing sequence of preference (i.e., x x x n 1 2 L for a preference ordering p ) and, second, cumulative probabilities are distorted by a transformation function.
The most general form of RDU was developed by Green and Jullien (1988) and Segal (1989) . Dual expected utility (DEU) is a special case of RDU and was axiomatized by Yaari (1979) . The axiomatization of DEU involves, besides the standard ordering and continuity axioms, two additional axioms: first, a dominance axiom, which forces preferences to be consistent with first-order stochastic dominance; second, as a sub-p pp stitute for the independence axiom, the dual independence axiom, which, roughly speaking, demands independence with respect to "consequence mixtures" of lotteries rather than with respect to "probability mixtures" as the standard independence axiom.
DEU has some interesting features: first, it is consistent with the experimental evidence, which motivated the development of non-expected utility theories; second, DEU allows for a separation of the concepts of risk aversion and decreasing marginal utility of money since the representation can accommodate risk aversion although marginal utility of money is constant. This becomes clear by considering the representation of preferences V, which is given by
where q is a simple probability measure and the transformation function g : 
, , DEU is equivalent to evaluating a lottery by its mathematical expectation. In this article it will be assumed that g(⋅) is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The concavity of g(⋅) is a necessary and sufficient condition for strong 1 risk aversion (see Chew, Karni, and Safra, 1987) because then the probabilities of the worst consequences are overweighted compared to their untransformed probabilities. The fact that g(⋅) is increasing results from the above mentioned dominance axiom. The representation of anticipated utility is obtained if x j in (1) is exchanged for u(x j ) where u(⋅) is a utility function as in expected utility theory.
Consider a random variable ε with E ε = 0. Since the work of Pratt (1994) , it is well known that, in the case of expected utility and a differentiable utility function, the risk premium ρ that a decision maker is willing to pay to avoid the random variable t ε is for a sufficiently small t given by ρ σ ε
; that is, ρ is proportional to t 2 and, thus, approaches zero faster than t. This fact has been termed as second-order risk aversion by Segal and Spivak (1990) . In the case of RDU, however, ρ is proportional to t, which is called first-order risk aversion. Segal and Spivak (1990) show that first-order risk aversion implies that dp dt t / , = + ≠ 0 0 which is caused by the kink of indifference curves along the 45 o axis of a two-outcome diagram.
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EFFICIENT RISK SHARING
We consider a pure exchange economy, which consists of I strongly risk-averse individuals indexed by i. Furthermore, there exist J states of the world, which are indexed by j and realized according to the objective probability distribution
( 1) 1 Note that in non-expected utility theory, risk aversion is defined as aversion to mean preserving spreads in risk (see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) ). According to Cohen (1995) , an individual exhibits strong risk aversion if she always strictly prefers a lottery q 1 to a lottery q 2 whenever q 2 is a mean-preserving spread of q 1 . 2 The existence of this kink is shown in the next section.
The initial endowment of each individual i can be characterized by a random variable x i , which takes on the value x i j if state j occurs. The aggregate wealth in state j is, therefore, given by
A risk allocation or risk-sharing arrangement now specifies the final wealth x i j for every individual i in every state j. In the following we want to characterize Paretoefficient risk allocations when the preferences of each individual i can be represented by DEU. We begin our analysis with the following observation:
Lemma: In the case of strict risk aversion of all agents, for every Pareto-efficient risk allocation the final wealth of every individual i is a non-decreasing function of the aggregate wealth; that is, for each couple of states (j, k), 
and
Then, (3) and (4) reveal that for both individuals the original risk allocation is a meanpreserving spread of the alternative risk allocation. Since both individuals are strictly risk-averse, the original risk allocation cannot be Pareto-efficient.
Note that the lemma is not restricted to DEU; i.e., the conclusion is valid for general risk preferences, which exhibit strict risk aversion.
The significance of the lemma lies in the fact that we have to know the rank-ordering of the final wealth of each individual in order to calculate individual utility levels, because in the case of DEU, consequences have to be arranged in an increasing sequence. The lemma shows that, for every Pareto-efficient risk allocation, the rankordering of final wealth for each individual is identical to the rank-ordering of aggregate final wealth. Henceforth, state 1 is the state of the world with the lowest aggregate wealth, while in state J aggregate wealth attains its maximal level.
Now the optimization problem of a Pareto-efficient risk allocation is characterized by the following Lagrangian:
The first summand in (5) is just the weighted sum of individual utility levels that have to be maximized subject to three constraints: First, the final wealth of each individual must not decrease if the aggregate wealth increases. This constraint is expressed by the second summand in (5) and follows from the fact that, in the case of DEU, consequences have to be arranged in an increasing sequence. Second, the risk allocation has to be feasible; that is, the sum of individuals' final wealth cannot exceed aggregate wealth in each state, as demanded by the third summand in (5). Third, the constraint represented by the fourth summand says that no individual receives a negative final wealth in state j = 1 and, thus, in no other state. We will comment on this constraint later.
We get the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
; , , ; , , and
, , and K Let us first investigate state j = J and consider two individuals, i and l. Equation (6) yields: 
From equation (11) we know that β β λ λ
Thus, we have for state J -1 λ λ β β β β h p h p
Suppose that individual i has the highest social probability weight for state J -1. Then, equation (14) By an identical argument we can show that the same result holds for all states j = 2, . . . , J.
Before we consider state j = 1, let us comment on the results obtained so far. The rationale behind this solution is the following fact: If we give individual i one dollar in state j, he has to receive at least this dollar also in all states k, k > j. This implies that we have to take not only h p
into account for the social evaluation of assigning this dollar to i. This is one difference between efficient risk-sharing with DEU and efficient risk-sharing with expected value maximizers, who have different perceptions of the probability distribution of the states. A more important second difference is identified below.
For state j = 1 we have to note that h p
, i.e., the social probability weight for state 1 equals λ i for all individuals i. Considering (9) and (11) (16), i has, thus, the highest social probability weight for all states j > 1. The preceding analysis now immediately yields the following result.
Proposition: An efficient risk-sharing arrangement in the case of DEU assigns the whole risk to the least risk-averse individual while all other individuals receive a constant payment.
This result differs significantly from efficient risk-sharing in the expected utility framework. There, and, according to Machina (1995) , for all other Fréchet-differentiable preference functionals, efficient risk-sharing assigns some residual wealth uncertainty to all agents; i.e., it is never optimal that one individual receives a constant payment if all individuals are strictly risk-averse. However, if one individual is risk-neutral, the solutions for expected utility and DEU coincide. Therefore, the least risk-averse individual in the DEU framework plays the same role as a risk neutral individual in the expected utility framework. In view of the Proposition, it seems unduly vague to refer to the optimal risk allocation as risk-sharing because the risk is not shared but simply assigned to the individual with the lowest cost of risk bearing. Therefore, it is an important conclusion that the benefits of risk-sharing in the case of DEU are not realized by sharing the risks but by exchanging the risks. In order to complete the comparison of the solutions with expected utility and DEU, we can consider the incremental share of an individual i, i.e., ∂ ∂ x x i j j . In the expected utility framework we have
where θ i denotes the risk tolerance of individual i defined by θ i i i
x u x u x ( ) ( ) ( ) = ′ ′ ′ for the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u i (⋅). According to our preceding analysis, we have for DEU: The result of the Proposition can be further clarified by a graphical analysis assuming that only two individuals and only two states of the world exist. Considering lotteries q with only two possible outcomes, x 1 and x 2 , and fixed probabilities, DEU is given by otherwise.
where p is the probability of receiving x i 1 .
Letting the total differential of (19) equal zero, and rearranging, yields the slope of indifference curves:
Hence, the indifference curves are piecewise linear and negatively sloped in the
Because the function g i (⋅) was assumed to be strictly concave, it is true that g i (p) > 1- < . This yields the kink of indifference curves along the 45° axis already mentioned in section 2.
For two individuals, i and l, the risk-sharing problem can now be analyzed in an Edgeworth box. We fix the utility of individual i at the level V i and the utility of individual l should be maximized. Recall that a higher degree of risk aversion corresponds to a more concave function g(⋅).
Suppose first that individual l is less risk-averse than individual i, which implies that her indifference curves ( V l ) are according to (20) steeper than those of i. This situation is depicted in Figure 1 with point a being the optimum. In accordance with our Proposition, individual i receives a constant payment in point a while l bears all the risk. If, on the other hand, individual l is more risk-averse than i, her indifference curves are flatter than those of i. This situation is depicted in Figure 2 and point b is the optimum, where l now receives the constant payment and i bears all the risk.
The graphical analysis also allows us to illustrate another difference between efficient risk-sharing with DEU and efficient risk-sharing with expected value maximizers, who have different perceptions of the probability distributions of the states. Obviously, the indifference curves of a risk-neutral individual are straight lines and their slope equals the negative probability ratio. Therefore, the solution of the risksharing problem is here not as for DEU a point on the certainty line of one agent, but a point on the boundary of the Edgeworth box. This means that one individual receives all the final wealth in the state that she perceives to be more likely than the other state.
Let us also take a look at the solution if the preferences of all individuals are represented by anticipated utility. Omitting the last constraint in (5), we can conclude from the preceding analysis that the first order conditions for all states j = 1, . . . , J is given by
This condition shows that also for anticipated utility, it is possible that one individual receives in state j the final wealth in state j -1 plus all the excess of aggregate wealth in state j. Consequently, it is also possible that we have Edgeworth boxes in Figures 1 and 2 . The indifference curves for anticipated utility have a kink like those of DEU but are convex as in expected utility theory. Inserting such indifference curves in Figures 1 and 2 reveals that, depending on the kink and curvature of indifference curves, the optimal points may be located either on one certainty line or between the certainty lines. Thus, in many cases the only difference to the solution with expected utility maximizers, who have different perceptions of the probability distribution, seems to be the fact that the final wealth of an individual in state j does not only depend on her social probability weight for state j but also on her social probability weights for all states k > j.
Finally, we briefly comment on the mutuality principle, which is an important result on efficient risk-sharing in the expected utility framework. It states that x i j for all i depends only on the aggregate wealth x j and not on the initial endowment x i j for all states j; that is, we have ∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ x x x x i j i j l j l j for all i, l, and j. Equation (18) immediately implies that the mutuality principle also holds for DEU; i.e., as in expected utility theory, the final wealth of each individual depends on her initial endowment only by its effect on the aggregate wealth.
CONCLUSION
The results of this paper for efficient risk-sharing can be summarized as follows: Although it is possible under first-order risk aversion that one individual bears all the risk, this is always the case for DEU since here first-order risk aversion is combined with linearity in the outcomes.
More generally, the results of this article combined with those of Schlesinger (1997) show that first-order risk aversion has quite different implications for insurance economics than second-order risk aversion. In view of Machina's (1995) robustness results for Fréchet-differentiable preference functionals, the lesson seems to be that it is not very important for insurance economics whether individual preferences satisfy the independence axiom but whether they exhibit first-order or second-order risk aversion.
Of course, the value of our results for risk-sharing depends on their ability to explain real world data. There are, however, at least two problems for such an evaluation. First, observed risk-sharing arrangements with all parties bearing parts of the risk do not necessarily contradict our results because they might be because of bankruptcy constraints, which have not been integrated in our analysis.
3 Second, our results are not necessarily supported if the whole risk is assigned to one party because this can also be the result of incentive problems in the presence of moral hazard.
